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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. REKWARD IS ENTITLED TO TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY 
FAYMENTS UNTIL HE HAS COMFLETED RETRAINING. 
Rekward is unable to return to any type of employment without 
retraining. He is , therefore, entitled to receive temporary 
total disability payments until he completes vocational 
rehabilitation. This is in harmony with the purposes of the 
workers compensation law, which are to compensate an employee for 
the loss of employability resulting from an tindustrial injury. 
II. REKWARD IS ENTITLED TO A HIGHER IMPAIRMENT RATING, OR A 
REMAND FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO ASSESS THE CREDIBILITY OF 
CONFLICTING MEDICAL OPINIONS. 
Rekward is entitled to a higher impairment rating based upon 
the credible evidence. The Industrial Commission erroneously 
concluded that the medical panel report and Doctor Orme's report 
were consistent. In the alternative, Rekward is entitled to a 
hearing to properly assess the credibility of the witnesses. 
Rekward1s objection to the panel report and motion for review, 
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pointing out the disparities and arguing the credibility of the 
same, has preserved the issue for appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. REKWARD IS ENTITLED TO TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY 
PAYMENTS UNTIL HE HAS COMPLETED RETRAINING. 
The respondent (hereinafter Foley) does not dispute the fact 
that Rekward cannot perform any vocational function without 
vocational rehabilitation and retraining. Rekward does not 
challenge the finding that he has reached the point of medical 
stabilization, ie, his physical condition is not likely to 
improve nor deteriorate from its present status. The issue, 
then, is how should Rekward be compensated. Rekward argues he is 
entitled to temporary total disability payments until he 
completes his vocational rehabilitation, at which point 
compensation on a permanent partial basis may be made. Foley 
argues Rekward must receive permanent partial payments from the 
date of medical stabilization, even though Rekward is incapable 
of returning to any form of employment. Thus, the issue 
presented goes to the very purpose of the workers compensation 
laws, which, as stated in Marshall vs. Industrial Commission 681 
P.2d 208, 210 - 211 (Utah 1984), is to compensate for the loss of 
employabi1ity. 
2 
Rekward feels he can be retrained and thus is not 
permanently disabled. Foley agrees and insists that Rekward "is 
too little disabled for his age and education level" 
[respondent's brief, page 8] to be permanently disabled. Thus 
Foley desires to contravene the entire purpose of the workers 
compensation laws by denying any compensation despite Rekwards 
present inability to work. 
Foley relies heavily on Booms vs. Rapp Construction Company 
720 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1986) in claiming that temporary total 
disability fully ends when medical stabilization occurs. In 
Booms the injured worker objected to the termination of temporary 
total benefits without a finding by the Commission that he would 
be able to return to work. The court held, on the facts of that 
case, that it was not necessary to make such a finding after 
medical stabilization had occurred. The fa<pts of this case are 
different, requiring a different result. Rekward is seeking 
retraining, something which Booms did not. Thus, after the 
retraining, Rekward will be in the same position as Booms, 
that temporary total payments should be terminated, regardless of 
ability to work. If Rekward were unable to work, his remedy 
would then be to seek permanent total disability, something he 
cannot now do without vocational rehabilitation, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated section 35-1-67 (1953 as amended). 
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The facts of this case and the facts of Booms are 
significantly different in another respect. In Booms , the 
medical panel made a finding of Booms ability to work, even in 
his former profession of a carpenter, with some restrictions. In 
addition, Booms own expert testified that there was work 
available that Booms was capable of performing at that very 
time. Thus, the actual issue was one of returning to his former 
work with no restrictions. Obviously such a factual situation 
does not qualify one for temporary total benefits. On the other 
hand, even Foley's medical expert acknowledged that Rekward would 
need retraining [R. p. 179] to be employable. Indeed, all of the 
evidence suggests that Rekward is in need of retraining to be 
employable at all. 
Foley argues that temporary total benefits cease immediately 
upon medical stabilization, arguing that the status automatically 
shifts to a permanent status at that point. While that is often 
the case, it not necessarily so. Johnson vs. Harsco/Heckett 737 
P.2d 986 (Utah 1987), in discussing temporary total benefits 
states: 
Determination of the temporary or permanent nature of 
disability is typically made when the claimant reaches 
medical stabilization. Once stabilization has occurred and 
the claimant moves from temporary to permanent status,"he 
is no longer eligible for temporary benefits". [Footnotes 
and citations omitted]. Emphasis added. 737 P.2d at 988. 
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Thus, although the usual case would find the worker moving 
from a temporary to a permanent status upon medical 
stabilization, such is not always the case. Here, medical 
stabilization has occurred, but the status Should not change from 
temporary to permanent until the completion of vocational 
rehabilitation. It can only change earlier if Rekward fails to 
cooperate in that rehabilitation, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated section 35-1-67 (1953 as amended). Rekward has always 
argued and continues to maintain that he is not entitled to a 
permanent partial award until his temporary total status 
terminates, which cannot occur, under the facts of this case, 
until he completes retraining. 
Foley argues that if Rekward cannot work and cannot be 
retrained, he might be eligible for permanent disability 
[respondent's brief pp.10-11], meanwhile maintaining that Rekward 
is ineligible for permanent total status due to his age and 
education [respondent's brief p. 7-8]. What is to happen to 
Rekward in the meantime? Here is a worker, injured in an 
industrial accident, who is unable to work at any occupation 
at present, as a result of the accident, and who is now being 
told he is entitled to no compensation while he struggles to 
overcome his disabilities and be retrained in a new occupation. 
Such a result is contradictory to the purpose and intent of the 
workers compensation laws. Such result should not take place in 
this case, where temporary total benefits should continue 
through retraining, at which time Rekward should be classified to 
a permanent classification. 
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II 
REKWARD IS ENTITLED TO A HIGHER IMPAIRMENT RATING BASED 
UPON THE CREDIBLE EVIDENCE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVES 
REMAND FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO ASSESS THE 
CREDIBILITY OF CONFLICTING MEDICAL OPINIONS 
The extent of Rekward's cervical impairment was greatly 
disputed by the three physicians who rated these impairments. 
Only Dr. Orme, the orthopedist selected by Foley to conduct an 
independent evaluation, stated the factors on which he relied in 
arriving at his determination of impairment. Despite Dr. Ormefs 
reliance on the guidelines established by the American Academy of 
Orthopaedic Surgeons [R.p. 178] in determining the percentage of 
impairment, the administrative law judge blindly accepted the 
panel report, without any indication of how the impairment was 
obtained. Foley argues that the Commission is 
the fact finding body and therefore must be affirmed. Rekward 
does not challenge the prerogative of the Commission to find the 
facts. However, as set forth in Utah Annotated Code Section 35-
1-77 (1953 as amended), the Commission is not bound to follow the 
panel report and to disregard the other evidence before it. The 
Commission did so in this case on the erroneous conclusion that, 
upon the bigger view, the reports of Dr. Orme and of the medical 
panel were consistent [R.p. 229]. The reports are not consistent, 
as Dr. Orme did not rate the hearing and psychological 
impairments, contained in the panel impairment rating. Dr. Orme 
found a cervical impairment of 20%, based upon the guidelines of 
the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons [R.p. 178]. The 
panel found a 10% impairment for the cervical injuries, with no 
indication what guidelines were used to determine the impairment 
[R.p. 212]. Thus, Rekward maintains there is not credible 
evidence to sustain the decision of the Commission. 
Rekward maintains, in the alternative, that this case must 
be remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine the 
credibility of the evidence. At a hearing, cross examination 
will bring out the required information to help the 
administrative law judge assess the credibility of the ratings 
and properly find the facts. As set forth in Rekwards brief, 
the right of cross examination is a fundamental right that is 
preserved to all applicants before the Industrial Commission. 
Foley argues that a hearing was not requested below and so 
cannot be sought on appeal. Rekward maintains that this issue 
was preserved in both the Objection to the Medical Report and 
Motion for Review filed with the Industrial Commission. Both of 
these documents point out the disparity between the rating of Dr. 
Orme and the panel. Both of these documents refer to the fact 
that only Dr. Orme indicated how he had arrived at his 
conclusions.The Motion for Review specifically raises the 
credibility of the various reports (R. p. 237). Rekward 
maintains that these challenges to the credibility of the medical 
reports, together with the fundamental nature of the right of 
cross examination has preserved this issue fpr appeal. 
Foley maintains that this case is analogous to a matter 
where an attorney fails to examine at the hearing and then claims 
on appeal that this right was denied [respondents brief p. 18]. 
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The problem with this analysis is that there was no hearing where 
cross examination could take place, the credibility of the 
reports assessed, and the proper factual determination made by 
the Commission. 
While the Commission clearly has the discretion to hold the 
hearing or to deny were the same, as set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated section 35-1-77 (1953 as amended) and Moore vs. 
American Coal Company, 737 P.2d 989 (Utah 1987), when the 
credibility of reports is in issue,a hearing is required to allow 
cross examination in order to assess the credibility of the 
reports. Justice Stewart, dissenting in Moore succinctly 
stated: 
I recognize that the medical panel is supposed to constitute 
a panel of neutral expert witnesses, but that does not 
make itfs determinations error free. Clearly, the members 
of the medical panel who prepared the report, are not 
intended to be adjudicators of the claimants right of 
compensation. 
The Claimant submitted a claim to be adjudicated. Instead, 
the commission disposed of the claim without even a 
pretext of due process. Due process requires that a person 
who asserts a legally cognizable claim be accorded a 
hearing and the opportunity to cross examine witnesses 
against him or her. (citations omitted). 737 P.2d at 991. 
As Justice Stewart noted, the issue of cross examination was 
not raised on appeal in Moore. As it was, the majority reviewed 
only the narrow issue presented, whether or not a hearing was 
mandatory or discretionary under the amended statute. 
In this case, where the issue has been raised, and the 
credibility of the reports questioned, Rekward is entitled to 
cross examine the physicians preparing the medical panel report. 
This is the only way that the credibility of various reports 
can be determined and a proper factual finding made. 
The Commission has abused its discretion in failing to 
grant Rekward the right of cross examination following the 
objection to the panel report, when the credibility of the 
medical opinions were questioned. The Commission further abused 
its discretion by following the panel report, under the erroneous 
conclusion that upon the bigger view, the jpanel report and Dr. 
Orme's report were consistent. 
CONCLUSION 
Rekward has suffered an industrial injury that will require 
him to undergo vocational rehabilitation before he can be 
productive in the work force. Thus , this is the rare case where 
his status has not yet changed from temporary to permanent even 
though he has reached a stage of medical stabilization. Rekward 
is entitled to temporary total payments until he completes 
vocational rehabilitation, at which point he is entitled to a 
permanent partial award whether or not he can find work. 
Rekward has objected to the panel report, drawing into 
question the credibility of the same. Rekward is either entitled 
to higher award based upon the credible evidence, or an 
evidentiary hearing to properly assess tlfie credibility. This 
award of this permanent partial impairment should be made at the 
end of his temporary total status, when he completes his 
vocational rehabilitation. 
Respectfully submitted this < day of February, 1988. 
S. JUNIOR BAKER 
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